Abstract-This paper presents a real-time implementation of autonomous microgrid protection using agent-based distributed communication. Protection of an autonomous microgrid requires special considerations compared to large-scale distribution networks due to the presence of power converters and relatively low inertia. In this paper, we introduce a practical overcurrent and a frequency-selectivity method to overcome conventional limitations. The proposed overcurrent scheme defines a selectivity mechanism considering the remedial action scheme of the microgrid after a fault instant based on feeder characteristics and the location of the intelligent electronic devices (IEDs). A synchrophasor-based online frequency-selectivity approach is proposed to avoid pulse loading effects in low inertia microgrids. Experimental results are presented for verification of the proposed schemes using a laboratorybased microgrid. The setup was composed of actual generation units and IEDs using the IEC 61850 protocol. The experimental results were in excellent agreement with the proposed protection scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION
A MICROGRID requires implementation of various power system concepts in a small scale network including stability, control and protection. When a microgrid is not grid-tied and operates in autonomous mode, this requires certain rules for a stable hybrid system operation, where ac and dc based distributed energy resources (DER) are linked through power converters [1] . When power converters and conventional electromechanical DERs are harmonized in a microgrid, the detection of the low fault contribution of the inverter-based DERs becomes extremely difficult and ensuring a reliable selectivity becomes challenging.
Remedial action schemes (RAS) are designed to remediate the disturbances by changing the network configuration according to predetermined rules including islanding, generator operation mode control, load shedding, and adaptive protection. Considering the future RAS capability of the microgrids, the conventional straightforward downstream to upstream delaybased overcurrent protection trip characteristics are becoming inadequate. Since autonomous hybrid ac/dc microgrids are not supported by a strong utility grid, the relatively poor system inertia introduces deteriorating effects to the system stability. Frequency is generally considered as the control reference for the ac side of the grid, where the dc bus voltage value is taken as reference for the dc network. Frequency protection of an autonomous microgrid is also more challenging compared to large transmission and generation networks, specifically in low inertia systems involving a number of power converters. Unlike normal distribution grid operations, the discrimination of a heavy loading and fault condition becomes a challenging task. Pulse loads are particular in that they draw high current in a very short time period, which can potentially cause the system voltage and frequency to drop in the entire microgrid momentarily [2] . Pulse loads exist inherently in battery charging platforms, specifically in pulse charging applications. Non-transient disturbances like pulse loads can be confusing for relays to distinguish whether it is a fault or a heavy loading condition. Thus far, central protection approaches are proposed to calculate the fault current of the DERs in a microgrid according to varying system topologies [3] - [5] and [6] . The major drawbacks of the centralized methods are the requirement of high communication capability with a powerful central controller, and being susceptible to single point failures. This vulnerability can easily jeopardize the system with a complete collapse. Most of the central control schemes are not suitable for microgrid operations, since the conventional relay coordination may not be sufficient for frequently varying conditions. Therefore, advanced distributed protection schemes and interactive communication are required to overcome microgrid protection limitations.
Due to their inherent resilience, decentralized approaches have drawn considerably more attention than the centralized methods for both protection and RAS. Agent-based decentralized approaches have the ability to self-check, and react accordingly to the prevailing environment conditions. Cooperative agent-based protection schemes are widely discussed in the literature. However, it has never reached a mature level, and stayed in the early development stage [7] - [9] . Malicious attack aware agents are utilized to increase the degree of fault tolerance in [10] , and an agent-based self-healing reconfiguration scheme has been discussed after a fault instant in [11] . Unfortunately, most of the works in literature do not address realistic circumstances, including overcurrent delay adjustments and frequency protection selectivity.
As DER penetration increases in smart grids, using vendor independent commonly accepted standardized communica-tions protocols, such as IEC 61850, are becoming crucial [12] . Agent-based protection schemes are becoming feasible to be deployed in realistic applications including SCADA and fault event recorders [13] . The emerging international standard IEC 61850 provides an efficient communication and interoperability framework while power system operations are in a transition from a centralized control to some form of decentralized functionality. Based on logical node definition, IEC 61850 shares similarities to multiagent systems with horizontal and vertical messaging structures [14] . The integration of IEC 61850 object modeling with executable function blocks enables industrial deployment of multiagent systems in power systems and automation applications [15] - [17] . While centralized control schemes rely on hierarchical long line of vertical communication, decentralized control schemes exploit horizontal high-speed peer-topeer communication. IEC 61860 based generic object oriented substation event (GOOSE) technology enables fast horizontal peer-to-peer communication to exchange messages between two or more devices with decentralized functions in around 0.25 cycle (4-5 ms) [18] .
This paper addresses the protection of autonomous microgrids using agent-based distributed communication to overcome overcurrent and frequency protection selectivity problems. A selectivity mechanism is proposed based on feeder characteristics and the location of the intelligent electronic devices (IEDs) considering the RAS of the microgrid after a fault instant. An online frequency-selectivity approach is proposed to avoid pulse load effects in low inertia autonomous microgrids. IEC61850 framework and GOOSE protocol messaging are used to enable high-speed peer-to-peer communication capability. To demonstrate the proposed protection scheme, real-time laboratory experiments are performed at Florida International University (FIU), smart-grid test bed [19] , [20] using a small scale power system including actual generation units and IEDs.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: the microgrid hardware and cyberphysical infrastructure are briefly introduced in Section II. The proposed overcurrent selectivity method and experiments are discussed in Section III. In Section IV, the proposed frequency-selectivity method and experimental results are introduced. Section V concludes the paper.
II. AUTONOMOUS MICROGRID SETUP
The microgrid setup at FIU is shown in Fig. 1 [19] , [20] . The setup involves a conventional synchronous generator, a gridtie inverter with a bidirectional power flow capability between ac/dc sides, five lithium-ion battery banks, PV panel emulator, and ac/dc loads. The IEDs include all required logical nodes as defined in IEC 61850-7-4 [21] . Two synchrophasor-enabled IEDs are employed in microgrid main buses. The available data of the DC microgrid is mapped to OPC UA middleware as the representation of IEC 61850-7-420 [22] data models to ensure interoperability with all logical nodes [35] , [36] . The microgrid infrastructure, IED deployment on microgrid feeders and the related logical nodes are shown in Fig. 2 . In this study, all IEDs are located on the same local area network (LAN), however a special router configuration can be applied for wide area network (WAN) GOOSE messaging [31] , [32] . 
III. OVERCURRENT PROTECTION SELECTIVITY

A. Overcurrent Selectivity Challenges
Conventional power system protection requires the protective devices to be connected in series, and the trip characteristics of the downstream protective device must be faster than the upstream devices. However, in hybrid ac/dc microgrids the following selectivity problems arise: 1) The inverter-based DER's fault contribution is limited to between 100% and 200% of nominal operational current according to the implemented current control scheme [23] . When inverter-based DERs are harmonized with electromechanical generators, the detection of the low fault contribution of inverter-based DER becomes extremely difficult and ensuring reliable selectivity becomes challenging.
2) The current practice of islanding detection requires islanded areas to cease from being energized within 2 seconds. This requirement drastically reduces the reliability and resiliency of the microgrid operation [23] . However, microgrids are expected to continue operation with a proper RAS capability and efficient supply reserves after unintentional islanding following a fault clearance. RAS schemes including seamless islanding, generation operation mode control and load shedding practices eliminates the mandatory shutdown requirement, thus increase the reliability and resiliency. Fig. 3 . illustrates the possible fault current routes in a microgrid structure featuring a synchronous generator, an inverter DER, and a grid connection point. The double arrows define the non-directional functionality, where the faults can be detected in both directions. In such a microgrid topology, a variety of network topology would prevail depending on the fault location resulting islanding, a simple isolation of the load feeders or a complete shutdown of the system. In normal operating conditions, the fault contribution of the different DERs have the below order:
(1) 
B. Proposed Overcurrent Selectivity Method
Unlike the conventional consecutively increasing time delay based protection schemes, the proposed approach aims to define tripping priorities according to upstream/downstream connection and the location type of the IEDs considering RAS scheme. Three definite time delay (DT) levels are adopted: 1) simple load feeder; 2) bus routing; 3) DER feeder. Table II shows the defined time delays of the microgrid with respect to IED locations. DT levels are in below order:
Overcurrent pick-up settings are determined through an offline protection analysis according to Table I , and embedded in active settings of the IEDs. Fig. 4 . shows the overall GOOSE peer-to-peer message traffic between IEDs for fault cases F1, F2, microgrid bus 1 (MG1) and microgrid bus 2 (MG2) including interlocking signals to block tripping and other control operators including DER mode of operation change and active setting control.
1) Fault (F1) at Utility Feeder:
At this fault point, IED1.1, IED4, IED1.2 IED2.2 and IED3.1 detect the fault current. IED4 detects the overcurrent on the reverse direction, which occurs only when the fault current is headed to upstream in the microgrid. Thus, IED4 can be selected as the main decision unit for the fault clearance in this fault point. A satisfactory clearance can be accomplished by tripping only IED1.1 and IED4. Accordingly, the microgrid can continue operation in islanded form once the fault is cleared.
When the directional protection function of the IED4 detects reverse overcurrent, the pick-up "Start" operator becomes high, the internal timer is initiated, and a blocking signal is published to IED1.2, IED2.2 and IED3.1 in order to block the opening of circuit breakers. Since IED1.1 and IED4 have the same definite time delays, the tripping is accomplished with an "Operate" operator when their timers expire after the 40 ms delay. Following the fault clearance, the microgrid transitions to autonomous islanded mode. Depending on the former import/export power exchange between the microgrid and the main grid, the resulting power imbalance would create a deviation in the system voltage and frequency beyond permissible limits. A system collapse is unavoidable unless an adaptive reconfiguration is assured with proper power sharing control, and a successful load shedding in the microgrid [24] , [25] .
DER feeder IEDs (IED1.2 and IED3.1) would provide generation and load balance by adjusting the system frequency and voltage to permissible limits. Load shedding scheme can be enabled by load feeder IEDs (IED2.1 and IED3.2). According to the new prevailing network topology, a new operation setting is enabled for all IEDs operating in autonomous mode. The microgrid would resynchronize with the grid once the fault is cleared. This function is enabled by the synchronism check (RSYN) The desired operation is only tripping IED2.1. Accordingly, the microgrid can continue operation without any reconfiguration. IED2.1 detects the faults only to downstream, which makes the selectivity simple and straightforward. In this case, no operation mode and setting change are necessary. Fault (F4) protection requires almost the same selectivity method as F3.
4) Fault on Microgrid Bus1 MG(1):
At this fault point, IED1.1, IED1.2, IED2.2 and IED3.1 detect the fault current. The directional bus routing IED2.2 coordinates the clearing process by continuously checking the upper level bus routing IED5 and IED4 pick-up operators. Even though, IED4 does not detect the fault, the low start operator crosscheck is mandatory to differentiate the MG(1) from F1. When IED2.2 "Start" operator is high, but IED5 and IED4 "Start" operators are low, the fault is determined to be on microgrid bus1. IED2.2 publishes the blocking signal to only IED3.1 as well as the mode of operation change command from constant active power (W) to voltage frequency regulation (V-f) mode. To establish a further RAS, a load-shedding signal can be published to IED3.2. Since the fault is sustained on microgrid bus, IED1.1 and IED1.2 trips after the 40 ms and 60 ms delay time, respectively.
5) Fault on Microgrid Bus2 MG(2):
In this fault point, the satisfactory clearing process should be the isolation of microgrid bus 2 and all connected IEDs. Thus, DERs and loads connected to microgrid bus 1 can continue grid-connected operation. At this fault point, IED1.1, IED1.2, IED5 and IED3.1 detect the fault current. IED5 coordinates the fault clearance process accordingly, when IED5 "Start" operator is high, and IED2.2 "Start" operator is low. Although it is not essential, a crosscheck mechanism can be applied by the simple load feeder IED3.2 start operator's low value to differentiate the MG(2) from F4. IED5 publishes the blocking signals to IED1.1 and IED1.2. Since the fault is sustained on microgrid bus, IED3.1 trips after 60 ms delay time. Since microgrid bus 1 continues to operate in grid-connected mode, no mode of operation switching mechanism is required.
C. Real-Time Implementation of Overcurrent and RAS
To validate the proposed protection scheme, F1 scenario fault was realistically demonstrated. The fault was created with applying an 18 Ohm high fault impedance to the F1 fault point on the distribution line between IED1.1 and IED4. Fig. 5 . shows the fault current contribution of the synchronous generator, inverterbased DER and the main grid during the fault instant. Initially, the microgrid was exporting power to the main grid. The nondirectional IED1.1 detects the overcurrent in the forward di- rection, and the directional IED4 detects the overcurrent in the reverse direction. IED3.1 and IED1.2 also detect the fault overcurrent. Fig. 6 . shows the pickup moment of the four IEDs detecting the fault overcurrent. As shown in Fig. 6 , during the fault instant, IED1.1, IED4, IED3.1 and IED1.2 pick-up operators become high. However, the desired operation requires only IED1.1 and IED4 to clear the fault. The pick-up duration is 40 ms for both IED1.1 and IED4. Since IED3.1 and IED1.2 are DER feeder IEDs, their pickup duration was set to 60 ms. While IED4 pick-up operator was high, the corresponding GOOSE messages were published on the network to block IED1.2, IED3.1 and IED2.2 circuit breakers as in Fig. 7 . When the GOOSE messages were received by the IEDs, the CTRL.XCBR.BlkOpn operator became high, blocking the execution of the circuit breaker opening command.
IED1.1 and IED4 cleared the fault by opening the circuit breakers when the pick-up timer was expired and the opening operation was executed. Fig. 8 shows the circuit breaker position status and active settings of the IEDs. IED1.1 and IED4 circuit breakers are initiated to open once the LDO.PTOC.Op.general operators become high. As shown in Fig. 8 , only IED1.1 and IED4 trip, and the other circuit breakers remain closed for the islanded operation. The active setting of the IEDs was altered from LDO.LLNO.ActSG1.stVal to LDO.LLNO.ActSG2.stVal. For this specific example, three setting groups were defined respect to Table I . ActSG1 defines the settings in grid-connected operation mode. ActSG2 defines the settings after F1, and ActSG3 defines the settings after F2. Initially all IEDs were at setting group-1 ActSG1. Only one active setting can be valid in run time. As shown in Fig. 8 , all IEDs were switched to active setting-2. After the fault clearing process, when the IED4 circuit breaker status CTRL.XCBR.Pos.stVal became zero, the microgrid transitioned from grid-connected operation mode to islanded mode. In order to adapt IED settings according to prevailing network topology, a GOOSE message was published to switch operation mode of the IED3.1 controlled inverter-based DER from fixed active power injection mode "LNO.DOPM.Op.ModConW" to "LNO.DPOM.Op.MdIsld" voltage-frequency regulation mode. Fig. 9 shows the fault clearance, islanding instant and frequency recovery by inverter-based DER following to operation mode change from constant (W) to voltage frequency regulation (V-f) mode. Fig. 10 shows the voltage variation along with active and reactive power before, during and after the fault instant. Initially, the synchronous generator and inverter-based DER were supplying almost all the demand in the microgrid. The power exchange between the microgrid and main-grid was very low. At the fault instant, the system experienced high spikes on active and reactive power, and a voltage dip. Once the fault was cleared, the system voltage settled down to nominal value for the islanded operation.
IV. FREQUENCY PROTECTION SELECTIVITY
A. Frequency Protection Selectivity Challenges
After a microgrid transitions to autonomous mode, the frequency support is no longer available from the main grid. The low inertia microgrid should be able to continue operation with scarce generation resources. Depending on the microgrid inertia, pulse loads can deviate the system frequency and voltage, surpassing maximum permissible limits. For autonomous microgrids, the allowable frequency band (59.3 to 60.5 Hz) is wider than wide area power system networks [23] .
Over/under frequency, rate of change of frequency (ROCOF) and vector surge relays (VSR) are commonly used for conventional frequency protection schemes with predefined thresholds [26] , [27] . However, in an autonomous microgrid, varying inertia and pulse loads introduce selectivity complexity in application. Various network topologies would prevail depending on the connected DER types. Inverter-based DER dominated microgrids are more prone to instant frequency and voltage dips under pulse loading conditions than synchronous DER dominated microgrids due to their low inertia. Therefore, conventional frequency protection schemes must be re-evaluated considering the various operating conditions of a microgrid by online adaptation and distributed agent-based communication.
Recalling Fig. 9 , during the fault instant and supply/demand imbalance moment the frequency drops beyond permissible limits. In pulse load applications, a similar frequency impact can be observed. Such impact can potentially cause the system voltage and frequency to drop in the entire microgrid, momentarily. Using the proposed overcurrent protection scheme, we were able to retain complete protection inside the microgrid at most 60 ms wait time period. However, this high-speed overcurrent selectivity introduces additional frequency-selectivity problem by lowering the microgrid immunity to the transient pulse load disturbances. The frequency protection functions can pick up and operate unexpectedly. A distributed agent-based protection scheme can be utilized to enable blocking conditions while pulse loads are on duty. In this way, pulse load and faults can be differentiated using a distributed communication.
The frequency control method of an autonomous microgrid drastically affect the frequency and voltage response of the system, and accordingly the protection scheme. Isochronous and droop controls are two fundamental frequency control concepts for typical autonomous microgrid operations. It is imperative to consider the operation modes of DERs before designing a proper frequency protection scheme. Power electronic based inverters respond more quickly to the load changes, where they pick up the changes initially until the synchronous generator reaches the steady state load sharing adjusted by droop setting. This situation also creates improper transient power sharing which may influence the protection scheme.
1) Isochronous Operation Mode: A single, considerably large generation unit is selected to accomplish no final speed change as load increases or decreases. In small autonomous microgrids, this method would provide an efficient way to respond load changes. However it is not feasible to employ such a method, where large number of generation units exist, since a proper power sharing cannot be provided. In a hybrid microgrid system, an isochronous synchronous generator can cover residual power imbalance on the ac side only. However, a grid-tie inverter has a capability to transfer power bidirectional either from the ac side to dc side, or the dc side to ac side. Fig. 11(a) shows the bidirectional inverter isochronous operation mode, where the measured power flow in the ac grid connection point can be negative or positive. Fig. 11(b) shows the single direction operation of the synchronous generator which can only export power. 2) Droop Operation Mode: The power sharing is enabled by local DER controllers with respect to frequency change in an autonomous microgrid. As illustrated in Fig. 11(c) , the frequency is varying due to load changes. This situation introduces high complexity in frequency protection designs. 3) Combined Droop and Isochronous: This method can be implemented to mitigate the pulse load effects, where power sharing is facilitated until the transient response of the isochronous unit reaches to its normal operation limit. Operation of two units are shown in Fig. 11(d) .
B. Proposed Frequency Protection Selectivity Method
A distributed agent-based protection scheme is proposed based on online inertia calculation and adaptive blocking while pulse loads are on duty. We presume each pulse load as an agent determining its possible impacts to the system, and enables blocking scheme accordingly. The inertia constant is continuously varying due to the number of connected power converters, hence it should be monitored online. Accordingly, the frequency protection references must be adopted online due to the uncertainty in system inertia.
The frequency variation of a microgrid is given under loading conditions, where the momentary variation is mainly dependent on the moment of inertia constant [33] :
where ΔP m ec is the mechanical power, ΔP load is the electrical load demand, ΔP dif is the instant load-generation imbalance, H tot is the total microgrid inertia constant, D is the load damping, and Δf is the system frequency. Online inertia estimation can be calculated with synchrophasor IEDs by introducing a small load perturbation for a sample period. Online inertia is calculated with a known sample period, active power change and two consecutive frequency measurements. Then, the frequency protection can be adjusted accordingly. The momentary frequency variation is mainly dependent on the moment of inertia constant. For simplification, the damping factor is assumed to be zero during the short time window for a small sample load perturbation [28] , [29] . The data window is adjusted as 60 message frames per second from phasor measurement unit. A more generalized equation of the (3) can be represented as:
where T s is the sampling period, Δf 1 and Δf 0 are the system frequencies at T 0 and T 1 .
C. Real-Time Implementation of Frequency Protection
Synchrophasor applications explicitly deal with the system disturbances of the dynamic operation of complicated systems. In this study, phasor measurement unit (PMU)-enabled IEDs are used to perform inertia estimation. High sampled data acquisition is adjusted to obtain 60 message frames per second. A common GPS time source is used to synchronize voltage and current waveforms in a fast and time-synchronized way. PMU-enabled IEDs are connected to a phasor data concentrator (PDC). A PDC can be considered as a station in a communication network, where PMUs populate the time-aligned measurements. The deployed PMUs in the system send acquired data with time-stamp information to the PDC. The collected data from a number of PMUs are sorted and correlated according to the time-stamp values. This enables a comparable real-time monitoring of the system with high precision sampling [30] . The frequency and phase angle difference protection references are calculated as:
The phasor representation of a sinusoidal AC signal is given as (5) where the phasor magnitude is X m , f 0 is nominal system frequency and ψ is the phase angle relative to synchronized coordinated universal time (UTC) [34] .
Two type of frequency protection functions were implemented. IED3.2 and IED2.1 are load feeder IEDs, which facilitate load shedding. IED3.1 and IED1.2 are the DER feeder IEDs equipped with under-frequency, and ROCOF frequency gradient protection functions. LSHDFRQ is the load-shedding logical node. FRPFRC is the frequency protection logical node including over/under frequency and ROCOF protection function. The pulse load was connected to the IED2.1 feeder. 421 PMU and 451 PMU are the station names of the synchrophasor IED1 and synchrophasor IED2, respectively as introduced in Fig. 2 .
Before the pulse train, a small sample load was applied to determine the system inertia, possible frequency deviation and the protection settings in the system. In order to determine inertia constant of the islanded microgrid, two consecutive frequency measurements were obtained from the phasor data concentrator for a sampling time. First measurement was obtained before the sample load triggering, and the second measurement right after the sample load by capturing frequency deviation in the system. Using two consecutive frequency measurements, as per (4), the inertia constant was calculated. By using inertia constant information, the pulse load agent determines if the pulse loading would excess permissible limits of the load-shedding (IED3.2) and frequency protection function (IED3.1 and IED1.2) values. Accordingly, when the pulse train was applied, pulse load agent (IED2.1) broadcasts the blocking GOOSE messages to subscribed IEDs. Fig. 12 shows the current measurement of the synchro phasorbased IEDs during the applied pulse train in autonomous microgrid with a period of 3 second. The sudden high power dense loads result instant frequency drops in the microgrid as shown in Fig. 13 . As the result of pulse loading, the voltage phase angles of the microgrid buses becomes far from each other. The phase angle displacement is shown in Fig. 14 . This situation would case unintended frequency protection tripping of the ROCOF and VSR relays. To overcome this problem, when the pulse load train was applied, IED2.1 broadcasts the blocking GOOSE messages to other IEDs as shown in Fig. 15 .
V. CONCLUSION
This paper investigated agent-based protection of autonomous microgrids with an industrial distributed communication IEC 61850 GOOSE protocol. Overcurrent and frequency protection challenges were assessed. A practical over current selectivity mechanism was introduced based on feeder characteristics and the location of the IEDs considering RAS. An online adaptive frequency-selectivity approach was proposed to avoid pulse load effects in low inertia autonomous grids. A state-of-the-art cyberphysical microgrid setup was introduced including IEDs and actual power system components. Experimental results were demonstrated in order to validate the effectiveness of the proposed schemes. The results were found out to be promising for actual field deployment of the challenging protection selectivity and RAS schemes in low inertia autonomous microgrids.
